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352 CHAPTER 9 LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 
SEEING BOTH SIDES 
DO PEOPLE WHO SPEAK DIFFERENT 
LANGUAGES THINK DIFFERENTLY? 
The role of language in mind 
Stephen C. Levinson and Asifa Majid, Max-Planck-lnstitute 
for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen. 
Imagine you were bom among the Pirahã, a remote tribe in the 
Amazon. You would speak a language with, it seems, no words 
for color, no words for uncles or cousins, no words for numbers, 
no easy way to talk about the future or to make complex sen-
tences by embedding (Everett, 2005). What, then, would be the 
character of your thoughts? Or suppose you parachute into the 
tribe, and learn to speak their language, do you think you could 
easily tell them about your world? 
Armchair thought-experiments of this kind used to intrigue 
linguists, laymen, and psychologists, such as Sapir, Whorf and 
Carroll. Then with the rise of the cognitive science movement in 
the 1960s they became suddenly unfashionable, because 
human cognition was viewed as a uniform processing machine, 
with a structure and content largely built into our genes. It fol-
lowed that the Pirahã, unbekownst to themselves, actually had 
the concepts 'pink', 'cousin', '17', 'next year', even 'algorithm' 
and 'symphony' - they simply didn't have the words for them 
(Fodor, 1975). There was a universal language of thought, 
'mentalese', for which different languages were merely an input-
output system (Pinker, 1994). This view is now losing ascen-
dancy, for a number of reasons, one is the rise of alternative 
computational metaphors (Parallel Distributed Processing, neural 
networks) that emphasize learning from experience, and another 
the phenomenal rise of neurocognition and the beginnings of 
neurogenetics, both of which reveal the importance of human 
differences. 
Another reason why interest is returning to the role of lan-
guage in cognition is empirical. It turns out for example that the 
Pirahã can't think '17'; they really don't have elementary number 
concepts (Gordon, 2004). No experiments have been done on 
their color discrimination, but in other cultures we find a sys-
tematic relation between the kinds of color words and color 
concepts. For example, speakers of a language like English with 
a 'blue' vs. 'green' distinction exaggerate the actual distance (in 
JNDs or just noticeable differences) between blue and green, 
while speakers of a language (like Taruhumara) with a 'grue' term 
covering both green and blue, do not (Kay & Kempton, 1984, 
Davidoff et al., 1999). Recently Kay and colleagues have shown 
that this effect is due to the right visual field, which projects to the 
left brain hemisphere where language is processed (Gilbert et al., 
2006), and that toddlers switch their categorical perception for 
color over to the left hemisphere as they learn color terms 
(Franklin et al., 2008a, b). Less surprisingly, a native language 
also changes our audition, we become blind (or rather deaf) in 
early infancy to sounds not in our language (Kuhl, 2000). Thus 
language alters our very perception of the world around us. 
What about more abstract domains like space and time? It 
turns out that the way we talk about time in a language makes a 
difference to how we think about it. In Chinese, a vertical spatial 
metaphor is often used so that earlier events are 'up' and later 
ones 'down', whereas in English we prefer to think of the future 
'ahead' and the past 'behind'. Chinese speakers, but not English 
speakers, are faster to respond to a time question when they 
have previously seen a vertical spatial prime (Boroditsky, 2001). 
This suggests that for thinking about abstract domains like time 
we borrow the language we use for the more concrete spatial 
domain, and so different spatial language makes a difference to 
temporal thinking. 
Spatial language itself differs radically across languages. In 
some languages there are no terms for 'left' and 'right' (as in 'the 
knife is left of the fork'). Instead one has to use notions like 'north' 
and 'south' even for things on the table (Majid et al., 2004)! 
Systematic experimentation in over a dozen languages and 
cultures shows how powerful these differences are (Levinson, 
2003). Speakers of north/south vs. left/right languages remem-
ber and reason in ways consistent with their spatial strategies in 
language, even when language is not required. An interesting 
question is which system is most natural? Experiments with apes 
and pre-linguistic infants suggest that the north/south one is 
core, and' the left/right emphasis comes from our own culture 
and language (Haun et al., 2006). So next time you pass the salt, 
think about how you might be thinking about it differently had you 
been bom in another culture! 
Our senses, and arguably our more abstract thoughts too, 
may be set up innately to deliver veridical information and infer-
ence, but rapidly in infancy we imbibe the language and cate-
gories of our culture and use these to make the discriminations 
and inferences that the culture has found useful through historical 
adaptation to its environment. As psychology enters an era of 
preoccupation with individual differences, we can be sure that 
many more ways in which language and culture influence cog-
nition (and, no doubt, constraints on those effects) will be 
discovered. 
